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AFTERTHOUGHTS FROM A "BUZZ KILLER"
Sarah Krakoff
When my husband is in the middle of telling a funny story, sometimes I
interrupt him because he misstates some inconsequential fact. For example,
he might be launching into the crazy story about his Aunt Jean's will, saying,
"Two years ago, when Aunt Jean died.. . ," and I cut in, "It was three and a
half years ago, not two." And then we have a little argument about whether
I am right or not, while the person to whom my husband was talking shifts
uncomfortably and glances at her watch. My husband accuses me of being a
"buzz killer" when I do this. I am almost always right, and he would agree,
about the inconsequential detail; but, he will always wonder, was it worth
killing the buzz just to insert the annoying reality check?
I really do not want to kill the buzz from the wonderful conference that
NCAI and Phil Frickey organized. As a whole-hearted supporter of the push
to encourage Indian law scholars to engage in grounded research, maybe I
should just slam my laptop shut right now. But as my husband will tell you,
it is very difficult for me to remain quiet. Therefore, I will try to be very brief.
My two concerns are first, that we should not be overly focused on the
judiciary as a potential audience for our work. And second, that we maintain
a healthy skepticism towards empiricism, even as we simultaneously embrace
its importance.
Some Thoughts About Audience
We should be careful not to misunderstand what Phil Frickey and others are
saying as,"We need to be better at telling judges how to rule in Indian law
cases." If we aim our grounded scholarship solely at the courts, we are likely
frequently to be disappointed, at least in the short run.' In addition, we run the
risk of distorting our research agendas in order to try to fit them into litigation
time frames or amicus brief strategies. This is not to say, however, that we
should act as if our only audience is other academics, and that we are oblivious
* Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School. Many thanks to Phil Frickey
for being receptive to my buzz-killing comments and then encouraging me to inflict them on
the rest of you.
1. See Conference Transcript: The New Realism: The Next Generation of Scholarship in
Federal Indian Law, 32 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 1, 5-6 (2007-2008) [hereinafter New Realism
Transcript] (transcript of a meeting of the National Congress of American Indians at Berkeley,
Cal., Nov. 17, 2006).
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to the consequences of our scholarship in the real world.2 Rather, I think we
should write for a broad audience, composed of anyone who might benefit
from real stories and data about law and life in Indian country. We are
writing, to return to the definition of scholarship that Frickey quotes, "to make
claims about the world as trustworthy as possible. 3 Our valid, trustworthy
claims about the world of American Indian nations may have no resonance
whatsoever in the world of federal judges. That makes our scholarship no less
valuable, but it may well make it a source of frustration if we are looking
solely to the standard of whether courts are citing to or influenced by our
work. Of course, if courts do find our work helpful, that is a good and
encouraging thing. It just should not, in my view, be the primary goal of
Indian legal scholarship.
There is another reason why our aim at a judicial audience should, at most,
be indirect and long-term. As Ronald Coase warned long ago, we must be
mindful of the feedback effects of legal rules. Coase was no Indian law
scholar, and his incisive critique of the Pigouvian approach to externalities
might seem to have little relevance to our field. But perhaps, as at least one
commentator suggests, we should rescue Coase's broad insights from their
capture by law and economics scholars.4 In particular, Indian law scholars
should heed Coase's observation that if adjustments to a legal regime do not
consider impacts on the entire system, the adjustment may result in feedback
effects that are undesirable.' I suspect that American Indian nation leaders are
acutely aware of the problem of feedback effects, even if it is also likely that
they do not use such vocabulary for it. While in Coase's example, the
potentially undesirable feedback effect of the railroad liability rule was the
2. I think the risk of this is quite small among our colleagues. Most American Indian law
scholars travel frequently between the worlds of practice and scholarship, and increasing
numbers are from or have close ties to tribal communities. Still, sometimes it is easy to get
distracted, in which case I recommend reading, or re-reading, Robert A. Williams, Jr., Vampires
Anonymous and Critical Race Practice, 95 MICH. L. REV. 741 (1997) (recounting the author's
tale of recovery from being a blood-sucking academic). Professor Williams closes with this
blunt injunction: "Get off your butt, go out and make a difference in the world. Or, think
independently, act for others. Whatever, you were taught your responsibilities, you know what
it is you have to do." Id. at 765.
3. New Realism Transcript, supra note 1, at 148.
4. See Pierre Schlag, An Appreciative Comment on Coase's The Problem of Social Cost:
A View from the Left, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 919.
5. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 32-34 (1960). As
Coase stated, "But the problem is to devise practical arrangements which will correct defects
in one part of the system without causing more serious harm in other parts." Id. at 34.
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under-production of rail service,6 in the politically charged and plenary power-
ridden world of Indian law, the feedback effect is often a congressional nip-
and-tuck ofjudicially recognized tribal powers.7 I do not want to overstate this
version of the feedback effect, given that in recent years it has been the Court,
and not Congress, that has done the nipping and tucking.' But the point is that
even if we could get the Court to do better, we have to remain ever aware of
the broader context. Information about the effects of legal rules on Indian
nations, the values served or suppressed by those rules, and the legal, political
and social contexts in which those values are formed (and contested) must be
interrogated irrespective of pending litigation. The feedback loop further
suggests that our audience should be broad. It should include people working
within and for Indian nations, the general public, legislators, and yes, even
courts;9 but not just courts, and certainly not only the Supreme Court.'0
Some Thoughts About Empiricism
In his introductory remarks, Phil Frickey cautioned us that doing shoddy
empirical work is worse than doing none at all." This is important advice. I
would also add that it is important not to do technically proficient empirical
work that is theoretically and politically naive. The concrete nature of some
forms of empirical research can be entrancing and misleading. We might take,
for example, the outcomes of regression analysis as fixed truths rather than
situated and tentative points of information. As critical theorists have
cautioned, we should maintain a sense of the structure while examining the
6. See id. at 32-34.
7. See, e.g., the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721(2006) (adjusting
the state-tribal balance of authority over Indian country gaming following judicial recognition
of sole tribal authority in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987)).
8. See David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States'
Rights, Color Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REv. 267 (2001).
9. This is entirely consistent with the "New Realism" framing. As Stewart Macaulay
observed, one of the things that should distinguish the "new" realism from the old is a much
broader sense of what law is as well as a larger audience horizon. See Stewart Macaulay, The
New Versus the Old Legal Realism: "Things Ain't What They Used to Be," 2005 Wis. L. REV.
365, 390-91 (discussing the need for a broad view of law, one not solely focused on the
distillation of conflicts in legal opinions).
10. As my comments during the conference indicated, our goals for the moment are
frighteningly modest, in that they are merely to win over even one or two of the typically more
"liberal" Justices. So, for example, even if we dislodge Justice Souter from his
misunderstandings, we are, in all likelihood, still one away from a majority. See New Realism
Transcript, supra note 1, at 98.
11. See id. at 6.
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individual parts, and should also be mindful that the empiricist, whether
quantitative or qualitative, comes to the world as it has been shaped by politics
and history. 12 The empiricist is also herself shaped by these forces, as well as
her own professional and cultural identity.13
On these points, we benefit tremendously from the explosion of law and
society work that has occurred since the first bout of legal realism, as well as
from the critical assessments that law and society scholars have conducted of
this body of work. At another "New Realism," conference, Professor Stewart
Macaulay distilled some of the lessons from the past four decades or so of law
and society work into some helpful insights. One lesson is that looking at facts
matters, even if we simultaneously should be aware of the ways in which
"facts" are situated and produced.14 As Macaulay writes:
Often, the best we can offer is a provisional and qualified picture
of the world as our best guess of what others would find if they
looked at what we examined. Yet, this is an advance over
supporting one's normative position by anecdotes, urban legends,
or statements based on no more than what we want to believe,
because too many law professors are expert in finding an example
or two of something, and asserting that it is a typical or important
enough phenomenon to worry about. Social science teaches that we
can and should do better.15
Another is that our view of what law is and how it operates should be from
"the bottom up."'16 By this, Macaulay means more than that we should study
the gaps between official law and "law in action." We should consider the
potential feedback effects of filling the gaps - of what full legal enforcement
would mean.'7 And we should also study informal understandings and cultures
of law.' 8 My sense is that these insights will seem quite natural to many
American Indian law professors. American Indian law, bound in history,
riddled with gaps, and beset, in endless intriguing and under-examined ways,
with informal understandings and mechanisms, is primed for the New Realism.
12. See David M. Trubek& John Esser, "Critical Empiricism " in American Legal Studies:
Paradox, Program or Pandora's Box?, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 3, 11-12 (1989).
13. See id. at 13.
14. See Macaulay, supra note 8, at 396-98.
15. Id. at 397.
16. Id. at 390.
17. See id. at 390-91 (discussing the likely undesirability of "full enforcement" of the law.)
18. See id. at 399-402 (discussing various examples of informal and supra-governmental
legal arrangements and mechanisms).
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So my concerns are perhaps only that as we embrace the tools of empiricism,
that we simultaneously remember the things we already know about our field,
many of which are part and parcel of the broader New Realist agenda.
Reviving the Buzz
In this last part, I will try to remind you, and myself, that we (yes, failing to
heed my own advice, my audience throughout this short piece has been very
narrow,) have the best jobs in the world. We are expected to spend thousands
of hours studying, thinking about, and expounding on things that fascinate us,
things that we care about. Not only that, it is our responsibility to initiate
future lawyers, to inspire them and remind them not just that they have to start
thinking "like lawyers," but that they have to keep on thinking like human
beings. We get to remind them that they have to think. How amazing is that?
And that part of thinking includes thinking critically, though not cynically. As
professors and scholars of American Indian law, we additionally have the
enormous privilege of doing this work in the context of some of the most
compelling and fascinating communities in this country. What this amounts
to is that whichever methods we choose to engage in to "make claims about
the world," that we try to, in the end, say something enlivening, something that
matters.
In addition, our fabulous jobs allow us to wear several hats so that we need
not cram all of our goals for engagement with the world into our scholarship.
If we want to reach out specifically to judges, we can participate in pro bono
litigation or draft amicus briefs, as many of us do. We can also (and I think we
should) arrange for seminars to educate judges both about the basic doctrine
of Indian law and the lessons from grounded scholarship. In addition, we can,
and again many do, engage in mutual consultation with tribal communities.
Our objectives with regard to each of these kinds of activities may often be
partially reflected in our scholarly work, but our scholarship can and should
also stand apart as a separate, slower, less instrumental enterprise, yet one
informed by a critical sense of both ourselves and the world that produced us.
So if I killed the buzz with my cautions about audience and unreflective
empiricism, I hope these reminders about our fortunate positions and our
corresponding obligations have revived it. If not, feel free to try my husband's
approach: roll your eyes, sigh, and keep on with your story.
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